The U.S. And India: The New Strategic Partnership
R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Moderated by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke
Question and Answer Session After his Speech at the Asia Society
The Asia Society, New York City
October 18, 2005
QUESTION: The Bush Administration has spent years urging all states to
strengthen export controls in order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
Yet the Bush administration now wants to loosen controls to help India. How do
you respond to critics, including many Bush Administration partisans, who say
you are in fact boosting the importance of nuclear weapons rather than
diminishing their importance? And how do you counter their concerns that you
will encourage other states like China to make exceptions for their friends?
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Before you answer Carol's question, let me add a very
precise addendum: Is, as your critics charge, the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty
effectively dead as a result of the deal you made with India?
UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is very much alive
and very much important to the future of the global order. We made this
arrangement with India with one conviction in mind: it was important to bring
India, and to allow India to be brought into compliance with the global
nonproliferation regime, for reasons that all of you understand, that it is
not possible for India to come into that regime officially and formally. But to
take the world's soon to be largest population and consign it to a place
outside that system does not appear to us to be strategically wise. Instead,
giving India's very good record in stemming and preventing the proliferation
of its nuclear technology over the past 30 years, we felt it makes sense to ask
India to open up its system, to submit to international inspections and
safeguards, and take the steps necessary in separating civilian and military
nuclear facilities that will allow it to come into effective compliance with
international norms.
You have to ask yourself, you have to choose: if you have that advantage of
bringing a new India into compliance with international norms, then of course
you further because of nonproliferation, you find ,on the other hand, you
retain the artificial distinction in an artificial world in which India has to
live. You don't achieve the benefits of the changes that India has agreed to
make. So, for all of us who care about nonproliferation, which I assume
everybody here in New York, and everybody there in Washington This is a step
forward, and that's why the United States decided to take this initiative.
I was the negotiator in this initiative with my friend, Foreign Secretary
Shyam Saran, and I can tell you that we thought long and hard about the respective
commitment we have to make to each other. India has made commitments to the
United States which I believe India will fulfill. We, Americans, our
government has made commitments in return. We are fulfilling them. In arguing for a
lessening of restrictions by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, in taking Indian
entities off the Commerce Department's list, and (inaudible) in seeking
congressional legislation that will change the American law to permit American
businesses to work on a more normal basis with India over the period ahead.
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Nick, now, let me thank you now on behalf of all for us
again having chosen the Asia Society to make this major speech on the eve of
your trip by knowing the world is literally listening to the speech today. You
mentioned Tom Friedman. I might just add that he opened his book tour here
pre-publication from the symposium, and faced some very hostile criticism. But
he did wonderfully well, and this meeting today following by only a week Chris
Hill's using the Asia Society as a platform to discuss North Korea, I think
symbolize the direction the Asia Society is going under President Desai and
her colleagues.
I want to ask the next question, then we will bring it back to New York. Other
than a brief passing mention, you didn't mention China. But you used the
phrase
"strategic partnership" to describe India. The Administration has deliberately
no longer used that phrase to describe its relationship with China, even
though, as you recall, that phrase was used by previous administrations. You
praised Bob Blackwill in your speech for his service. He has written at least
two major articles in the Wall Street Journal, stating -- as a private citizen
-- stating that one of the major reasons behind this improvement of
India-American relations is as a counterweight to China. I fully support the
improvement of relations with India, and I think everyone in this room does,
but there is this issue of whether there is an additional motive, as you well
know, your colleagues well know, in Beijing, among Chinese watchers and
Chinese
officials speaking off-the-record, that concern has been voiced. So would you
care to deny and address it?
The problem is we have worked so close together for so long and you are
watching one of the greatest diplomats in America, in American modern history,
and I know what he is going to say.
UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: But I don't have to say that.
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Well, I think there are people in New Delhi and Beijing
who want to hear.
UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: Thank you for the easy question you gave to me, Dick.
The U.S.-India relationship has to stand on its own. How could the United
States -- as it looks over the world, as it looks for allies in the world in
the next century -- not focus on India? One billion free people living in a
democracy, living in a country that shares a lot of values that our country
embodies: tolerance for multi-religiosity, for multi-linguilism, and for a
multi-ethnic life. India is a personification of that country, and so are we.
The essence of any great relationship in history between two countries has to
rely on this societal cohesion, as similarities that lie in the foundations of
this relationship.
Second, we are looking for partners in the world. We are going to face a very
different strategic picture in the future than we are faced in the past
quarter-century. There is much less emphasis on state-to-state threats than
there are in global threats, and I mentioned that in my speech. But the fact
is, if you look at the agenda of the Secretary State of the United States or
the Foreign Minister of India, that agenda is increasingly not the traditional
continental issues of war and peace, but global climate change, trafficking of
women and children, and drugs and crime, and WMD proliferation.
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: We went through the Beijing-Washington-Moscow triangle.
And the Sino-American relationship, as you will remember, was forged,
originally, over a common adversary. I am not saying it's a duplicate here,
but
the great new triangle is really Delhi-Beijing-Washington, for reasons that
you
outlined perfectly in your speech. Everyone wants to see U.S.-India relations
improved. But the issue is that several of your colleagues and ex-colleagues
have been very explicit on this strategic counterforce argument, and that
needs
to be addressed.
UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: And I am going to finish my answer, thank you very
much. And the answer is we need a democratic partner that is a global power
that can help us fight against these transnational problems that are at the
heart of our foreign policy agenda. Shared values and shared interests are
usually at the root of any diplomatic friendship, and that is the case in the
United States with India. As we look towards China, as Secretary Rice said
very
often, we don't seek to contain China, we seek to engage China. Our Deputy
Secretary of State Bob Zoellick was in Beijing in early August. He started the
global dialogue with China.
China is a country that we hope will increasingly take on management of these
world problems with us -- and with India, and the EU, and Japan, and Australia
and Brazil, and South Africa and Nigeria, the other great countries in the
world among them that are going to be responsible for working together on an
equal basis to attack these problems. I didn't describe some kind of
Delhi-Beijing-Washington axis in my speech. The words aren't there. The
thoughts aren't there. We have regional allies that are paramount in our
foreign policy. India has become one of our allies.
QUESTION: Ambassador Burns, you mentioned that during the Cold War, the U.S.
was aligned and India was non-aligned. Isn't it true that India was aligned
with the Soviet Union toward the end of the Cold War? And now India is
non-aligned, based on India's voice in the UN and massive military supplies
from the Soviet Union to India?
QUESTION: It is exactly three months since President Bush and Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh signed the civil-nuclear agreement. Why is it that the
Administration has still not forwarded sort of even a draft proposal to the
Congress? A lot of lawmakers I have interviewed told me that they have been
quite surprised that not even a draft proposal on this agreement has been
submitted to them so that they have something to work with in terms of trying
to affect some of the changes. And why is it that you, when you appeared
before
the International Relations Committee, did not strongly defend against this
sort of extraneous Iran argument that was brought? Because a lot of the Indian
diplomats talk to the effect that this is a U.S.-India civilian-nuclear
agreement, and there is no reason for the likes of Tom Lantos and others to
bring in the Iran argument and arguing that it is going to be a choice between
the U.S. and Iran vis-à-vis India.
UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: Thank you very much for your question. Let me answer
that question first. The agreement that President Bush and Prime Minister
Singh
made in Washington on July 18th is very specific. It talks about the advent of
civil-nuclear cooperation between our countries. It also says, very
explicitly,
if you read it, that the U.S. has certain commitments to bring this about, and
India has certain commitments. In our very first conversations, I made it very
clear to the Indian Government. They made it clear to me that it could not be
possible to implement this agreement by August, or September or October. Both
of us have to take undertake a series of very complex steps -- in our case
legislative; in India's case to separate civil and military nuclear facilities
that will require months of work.
My trip to Delhi is meant to focus on this work and to agree on a timetable
that will lead to the decision in the U.S. Congress to change our law and to
the ultimate decision of the Indian Government to make a commitment to our
decisions. I don't find it odd. I don't find it unusual. We knew this is a
very
complex piece of work that will take time. I think by the time President Bush
visits Delhi, and India, in the early winter of 2006, you will have seen both
governments have met our commitments, and I hope President Bush and Prime
Minister Singh will be in a position bring this agreement into effect.
I would also say I was present in the House International Relations Committee
as you referred to, and Iran is a major issue in United States. We see Iran --
a country trying to achieve nuclear weapons capability -- we see it as the
largest supporter and financer of terrorist groups in the Middle East. And so,
we are fundamentally concerned about the recent conservative direction and new
conservative direction of the new Iranian government. The fact that India, in
late September, voted in the IAEA, along with Australia, and Japan, and the EU
and the US, to find Iran in non-compliance was for us a very important sign
that India is a responsible nuclear power, that India agrees nonproliferation
norms have to be respected. It would have been unusual, I think, to see the
opposite as a result.
So Congressman Lantos has every right to raise the issue as he did. And I must
say I was the witness of the hearing that day -- he was seconded by all the
Republicans as well as all the Democrats on his side of the aisle. And I think
since the Indian government was very clear and decisive to vote in the IAEA,
that issue has disappeared in the U.S. Congress and we now find substantial
support in the U.S. Congress for the agreement reached on July 18th.
QUESTION: News reports [that the] U.S. only supports Japanese membership in
Security Council. Given the perspectives you lay out where one can confidently
predict what kind of country India will be in 25, 55 years in the future, and
given the vision of the U.S.-India strategic partnership may be one of the
most
vital relationships for the U.S. going forward, how do you see U.S.'s support
for an India seat in the Security Council evolving?
QUESTION: Former US Defense official here Henry Sokolski recently made the
argument that because fissile material is fungible, and for other reasons, the
proposed nuclear exchanges as part of this deal could help India build more
nuclear weapons per year. He also argued that the proposed space launch aid or
transfer, whatever happens, could help India's ICBM program. Do you dispute
this? Could you explain why? Thank you.
UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: Thank you very much. Let me answer the first question.
When Secretary Rice was in Delhi earlier this year she was asked this question
about whether or not the U.S. would support India for a permanent seat in the
Security Council. She answered by saying we were not at a point to go beyond
our support -- our 10-year-old support -- for Japan on the Council. Japan is
now the only country we are publicly supporting for a permanent membership in
the Council. But she said India's role was such in international institutions
like the United Nations and G-8 that those institutions have to adapt
themselves to India's role in the world. I say that not to be indirect in
answer to your question. The fact is that as we approached the UN reform in
the
past few months, in anticipation of the UN Summit that was held here last
month, we were mindful that we have to build the United Nations from the
ground
up. And the part of the United Nations that is working best right now is
probably the Security Council. So, our Administration focuses on the
management
and budget reforms, the human rights reforms, the peace building reforms. Now
that we have achieved that, the U.S. is fully prepared to look at the question
of Security Council expansion.
We have actually put a plan on the table that we would like to see the Council
enlarged, perhaps by six or eight new members: some new permanent members,
some
new non-permanent members. As that debate evolves there is every reason to
believe that countries will put themselves forward for memberships. We just
have to see where it goes. But I anticipate more and more as we look at the
issue of United Nations reform, this issue of permanent membership is going to
come into fore. The U.S. is not set on all aspects of this issue. Of course
our
position may evolve in the next year or two or three, but at the current time
we are supporting Japan. And we do obviously support a more vigorous role for
India in the UN system.
I will say briefly on the question from Washington about the nuclear deal, by
recognizing the steps India has taken to responsibly control its nuclear
material, and to advocate we now have civil nuclear energy cooperation, we are
not in effect recognizing or legitimizing India's nuclear weapons program.
There is a division between these two issues and that is clear in the
negotiations that we had with the Indians. And the key factor, I think, as
your
question implies, is that there has to be a separation between what is done is
the civil field and what is done in the military field. And that is at the
heart of the agreement. We think that separation will allow us to engage
nuclear cooperation in such a way that does not lead to any kind of leakage of
technology into the military ground.
QUESTION: After you have really surveyed Indo-Pakistan relations, do you think
their support for a Pakistan military is tenable for India? How do you
visualize the relationship between India and Pakistan growing if there is a
military government?
QUESTION: I really think that Mr. Burns, your policy toward India would be one
of the greatest achievements of this Administration. I kind of hate to ask
this
question because you articulated it also well, but it is sort of a big pink
elephant in this room to me. India, rightly, has some hesitation about the
American position, given our 50 years of history. We've let them down. That
vote in the IAEA was very difficult, given that India has the second largest
Shiite population after Iran. But the point is that they did it. My question
is: recently there have been reports in the Delhi papers that the Bush
Administration is considering selling 75 F-16s to Pakistan; how can you
reconcile a policy that could do both things? And maybe you could tell us a
little bit about what you know the domestic politics in India on that issue.
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Will Washington's improving relations with India bring
us to a position where we can play any role in Kashmir issue?
UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: I would be happy to do that, and I would be happy to
give you a quick answer. Kashmir is so sensitive in the relations between
India
and Pakistan that it is best to be left to the Indians and Pakistanis to work
on together. How's that for a diplomatic statement? I think both governments
desire to do so, and obviously we wish them well.
And I will answer the two questions in a really neat one, in a neat whole. We
have been encouraged to see the nascent rapprochement between India and
Pakistan, and we want this to continue. And if there is a way for the U.S. and
other countries to be helpful, we will be helpful. But we should be under no
illusions. These are two very proud, very rich countries in terms of their
history and culture. They have a sense of themselves, and they are going about
this rapprochement in their own way. We on the sideline should welcome that,
should applaud it. If we can help along the way, we shall, but we should not
consider ourselves an intermediary in this process and neither country sees us
as intermediary. We should see this progress continue in the period ahead.
I would add, to answer to your question, and the question from Washington, in
the following way: When Condoleezza Rice was in Delhi and Islamabad on her
first trip -- as Secretary of State -- to South Asia, she said we have to
de-hyphenate America's relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan. And Secretary
Whitehead will remember, in his long years in government, we have been always
under pressure that our government has to balance what we do with Delhi with
what we do with Islamabad. The fact is these are two extraordinarily important
countries to the U.S. and we should have full and independent relationships
with both of them. And we should not be embarrassed about a full relationship,
strategic relationship with India. We should not think this somehow put into
question our relations with Pakistan. It doesn't.
Let me say a word about Pakistan. Pakistan is a very important ally of the
U.S.
It is a singularly important ally on the question of the fight against al
Qaeda, number one, of the fight against global terrorism in general, and
number
two, in protecting the Pakistan-Afghan border and providing a stable border so
that we can both help to secure an independent and successful Afghanistan in
the future. So yes, we have committed to extend military assistance to the
government of Pakistan, and we announced earlier this year that we have
notified the Congress to sell certain military technology to Pakistan, and we
will continue to try to be as helpful as we can to President Musharraf and his
government. He is a very strong friend to the United States.
And when we talk about our strategic partnership with India, which is my
subject today, it doesn't mean we are somehow calling into question our
partnership with Pakistan. But my focus is India. And in the end, that is the
last question today. We are convinced that the foundations are in place, that
they are strong because they don't just rest on the position of one government
or two governments in time. They rest on the Indian-American community; they
rest on the business ties that those in the business community are now
building; and they rest on the shared interests for the future threats that
both of us have to face together. That's a solid relationship, and that is the
position I tried to advance today. We Americans need to take care of that
relationship, to advance it, and to build it in the future. Thank you very
much.
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Before we conclude, I want to make one point in regard
of your initial comments about Africa and AIDS: that is that I don't feel that
we
can ever discuss India -- and I feel passionately on this subject -- without
at
least mentioning HIV/AIDS. There are countries in denial, and there are
countries not in denial. China is not in denial thanks to Madam Wu Yi. India's
previous government was in total denial; the current government is trying to
do better. We at the Asia Society have a very active program on AIDS sponsored
by the Gates Foundation -- Betsy Williams is in the audience, who works on it.
I just need to underscore that this problem, if not dealt with, can undermine
a
great deal of the rest of what you said.
And now, in conclusion Nick, I cannot thank you enough for coming here. Joe,
thank you for running such a splendid Washington side of this. Thank you for
choosing us for this very important and brilliantly-structured presentation.
Please join me in thanking Under Secretary, Mr. Burns.
Released on October 26, 2005
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