U.S.-Indian Nuclear Energy Cooperation: Security And Nonproliferation Implications
R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Remarks as Prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC
November 2, 2005
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting Under
Secretary Joseph and me to discuss the current state of our relations with
India and, specifically the development of full civil nuclear energy
cooperation between India and the U.S. The July 18 visit of Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh to Washington marked a watershed in our ties with the
world's most populous democracy.
President Bush's desire to transform relations with India is based on his
conviction that, as he has said, "This century will see democratic India's
arrival as a force in the world." We believe it is in our national interest to
develop a strong, forward-looking relationship with India as the political and
economic focus of the global system shifts toward Asia. We know that many in
Congress embrace this view. And the time is right. The Cold War, when India
was the ultimate non-aligned nation and the United States the ultimate aligned
nation, is long past. It is time to shift our U.S.-India relationship to a
new, strategic partnership for the decades ahead.
India is a rising global power with a rapidly growing economy. Within the
first
quarter of this century, it is likely to be included among the world's five
largest economies. It will soon be the world's most populous nation, and it
has
a demographic distribution that bequeaths it a huge, skilled and youthful
workforce. India's military forces will continue to be large, capable and
increasingly sophisticated. Just like our own, the Indian military remains
strongly committed to the principle of civilian control. Above all else, we
know what kind of country India will be decades from now. Like the United
States, India will thrive as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual
democracy, characterized by individual freedom, rule of law and a
constitutional government that owes its power to free and fair elections.
Under Secretary Joseph and I are here as part of a consultation process with
both houses of Congress to seek eventually the adjustment of U.S. laws to
accommodate civil nuclear trade with India. We are at the very beginning of
that process. We will work closely with Congress to determine the best way
ahead.
Since President Bush agreed with Prime Minister Singh on this nuclear
initiative on July 18, we have discussed with many of you individually where
best to begin the decision-making process with Congress. Both of us testified
before the House International Relations Committee in September. Secretary
Rice
has briefed the Senate and House leadership on this initiative. She is eager
to
engage with you in more detailed discussions in the coming months. We have
already had extensive briefings of House and Senate staff, and we even invited
House staff to attend with us the meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in
Vienna two weeks ago dealing with the Indian civil nuclear issue. In short, we
have shared with the Congress our rationale for the July 18 agreement and have
consulted consistently and in detail on our discussions with the Indian
government since that time.
Secretary Rice, Under Secretary Joseph and I look forward to continuing this
dialogue. We recognize that the pace and scope of the initiative requires
close
consultation with Congress and we welcome your suggestions and advice as we
move forward.
Indeed, we cannot go forward on this initiative without the express consent of
Congress. The advent of full U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with India
requires
adjustments in U.S. law. I had the privilege of negotiating the July 18
agreement for the U.S. and remain the principal negotiator with the Indian
government. Based on my visit to New Delhi two weeks ago, it is clear that it
will take some time for the Indian government to fulfill all of the
commitments
it made in the July 18 agreement. The actions India committed to undertake are
difficult, complex and time-consuming. The Administration thus believes it is
better to wait before we ask Congress to consider any required legislative
action until India is further along in taking the necessary steps to fulfill
our agreement. I believe that will likely be in early 2006.
Our judgment is that it would not be wise or fair to ask Congress to make such
a consequential decision without evidence that the Indian government was
acting
on what is arguably the most important of its commitments the separation of
its civilian and military nuclear facilities. I told the Indian leadership in
Delhi two weeks ago that it must craft a credible and transparent plan and
have
begun to implement it before the Administration would request Congressional
action.
My counterpart, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, assured me that the Indian
government will produce such a plan. He stressed last week to a domestic
audience at the New Delhi-based Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses, "It
makes no sense for India to deliberately keep some of its civilian facilities
out of its declaration for safeguards purposes, if it is really interested in
obtaining international cooperation on as wide a scale as possible." As India
begins to meet its commitments under our agreement, we will propose
appropriate
language that would be India-specific and would demonstrate our dedication to
a
robust and permanent partnership.
I have invited Foreign Secretary Saran to Washington in December to continue
our talks, and I intend to return to India in January to further our
understanding of India's plans to separate its civil and military nuclear
facilities. We will, of course, keep the Congress fully apprised of all these
discussions. We hope very much that India can make the necessary progress to
allow us to refer legislation to Congress by early 2006.
The Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative
Mr. Chairman, you requested that we answer three questions in this hearing:
first, why is it necessary to draw closer to India; second, how would U.S.
concerns about India's nonproliferation policies be addressed by this
agreement; and, third, will our proposed policy change apply to countries
other
than India. Under Secretary Joseph and I will respond to each of your
questions.
When Secretary Rice set out last spring to develop the structure of such a
partnership, we knew we would have to deal with the one issue that has
bedeviled U.S.-India relations for the last 30 years the nuclear issue.
We determined from the start that we could not recognize India as a nuclear
weapons state. Such a step would weaken fundamentally the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and would be logically inconsistent with U.S.
policy under the last seven American presidents. It was equally clear that
India would not become a party to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state.
We also knew that we would have to confront the more difficult and complex
issue of whether to work with India on full civil nuclear cooperation. India
had made this the central issue in the new partnership developing between our
countries. As you know, past Administrations had decided to forego such civil
cooperation with India due to India's nuclear weapons program and its status
outside the nonproliferation regime. We had to decide whether this policy
remained consistent with U.S. interests in building a strong nonproliferation
regime and with our obvious priority of improving relations with the world's
largest democracy.
Because India developed nuclear weapons outside the regime, we had no existing
cooperation between our civil nuclear energy industries and, as such, no real
influence on India's adherence to the critical international nonproliferation
standards that are the bedrock of our efforts to limit the spread of nuclear
technology. While not formally part of the NPT regime, India has demonstrated
a
strong commitment to protect fissile materials and nuclear technology. Indeed,
as other responsible countries with advanced nuclear technology, India has
resisted proposals for nuclear cooperation with nuclear aspirants that could
have had adverse implications for international security.
We weighed the pros and cons of whether or not to seek changes to U.S. policy
and ask Congress for authorization to begin full civil nuclear energy
cooperation.
We decided that it was in the American interest to bring India into compliance
with the standards and practices of the international nonproliferation regime.
And, we decided that the only way to reach that goal was to end India's
isolation and begin to engage it. India will soon have the largest population
in the world, and to consign it to a place outside that system did not appear
to bestrategically wise and has not proven effective.
Withoutsuch an agreement, India, with its large and sophisticated nuclear
capabilities, would continue to remain outside the international export
control
regimes governing commerce in sensitive nuclear and nuclear-related
technologies. With this agreement, given India's solid record in stemming and
preventing the proliferation of its nuclear technology over the past 30 years,
the U.S. and the international community will benefit by asking India to open
up its system, to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities, and to
submit to international inspections and safeguards on its civil facilities,
thus allowing it to bring its civil nuclear program into effectiveconformity
with international standards.
India will assume the same nonproliferation responsibilities as other
responsible nations with civil nuclear energy and will protect against
diversion of items either to India's weapons program or to other countries.
U.S.-Indian cooperation on nuclear energy will therefore help strengthen the
international order in a way that advances widespread international equities
in
nuclear nonproliferation. It also will allow India to develop much more
quickly
its own civilian nuclear power industry, thus reducing demands on the world
energy market and in a way that provides clean energy for the future.
This was not an easy choice. We do not live in an ideal world. We concluded we
had a better chance to have India meet international nonproliferation
standards
if we engaged rather than isolated it. We believe the resulting agreement
advances our strategic partnership and is a net gain for nonproliferation. We
do not plan to offer such cooperation to any other country.
In addition to aligning ourselves with a country that shares our democratic
values and commitment to a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society, developing
civil nuclear cooperation with India will bring concrete benefits to the U.S.
and to the international community more broadly. Under Secretary Joseph will
address this initiative in detail, but let me outline here some of the key
reasons why we believe this initiative makes excellent sense:
* Security Benefits: All the steps that India pledged on July 18 strengthen
the international nonproliferation regime, and all align with our efforts
to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. India's September
vote in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that found Iran in
noncompliance with its nuclear obligations reflects India's coming of age
as a responsible state in the global nonproliferation mainstream.
* Environmental Benefits: Nuclear energy is one of the few proven sources of
energy that does not emit greenhouse gases, and thus can help India
modernize in an environmentally friendly manner that does not damage our
common atmosphere and contribute to global warming.
* Commercial Benefits: As a result of our involvement in India's civil
nuclear industry, U.S. companies will be able to enter India's lucrative
and growing energy market, potentially providing jobs for thousands of
Americans.
* Energy Benefits: India's expertise in basic science and applied
engineering
will add significant resources and substantial talent in the development
of
fusion as a cheap energy source if India can participate in the
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) program and help
make the next generation of reactors safer, more efficient and more
proliferation-resistant as a member of the Generation-IV Forum (GIF).
The Broader Relationship
Although our civil nuclear initiative has garnered the most attention, it is
only part of a much broader and deeper strategic partnership with India,
something that has not really been possible until now.
In late June, Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee and Secretary of Defense
Donald
Rumsfeld signed a New Defense Framework that will guide our defense relations
for the next decade. We're planning to enlarge defense trade, improve
cooperation between our armed forces, and co-produce military hardware. The
brilliant cooperation of our two militaries during the response to the Tsunami
disaster last December was a remarkable testament to how far we have come, and
the great potential we have for the future.
A strong, democratic India is an important partner for the United States. We
anticipate that India will play an increasingly important leadership role in
21st Century Asia, working with us to promote democracy, respect for human
rights, economic growth, stability and peace in that vital region. By
cooperating with India now, we accelerate the arrival of the benefits that
India's rise brings to the region and the world. By fostering ever-closer
bilateral ties, we also eliminate the possibility that our two nations might
overlook their natural affinities and enter into another period of
unproductive
estrangement as was so often the case during the Cold War period. By
challenging India today, with a full measure of respect for its ancient
civilization, traditions and accomplishments, we can help it realize its full
potential as a natural partner in the struggle against the security challenges
of the coming generation, and the global threats that are flowing over, under
and through our respective national borders.
I visited New Delhi two weeks ago and held an extensive series of discussions
with senior Indian officials on the range of our foreign policy interests.
While there, I had broad-ranging discussions on many issues, everything from
HIV/AIDS to the situation in Nepal to our concerns about Iran. The July 18
Joint Statement calls for government-to-government joint cooperation in many
areas, including civil nuclear cooperation; a U.S.-India Global Democracy
Initiative; an expanded U.S.-India Economic Dialogue focusing on trade,
finance, the environment, and commerce; continued cooperation in science and
technology; an Energy Dialogue to strengthen energy security and promote
stable
energy markets, an Agricultural Knowledge Initiative, an Information and
Communications Technology Working Group; Space Cooperation; a U.S.-India
Disaster Response Initiative; and the U.S.-India HIV/AIDS Partnership. Foreign
Secretary Saran and I have already begun working on the joint ventures that
the
President and Prime Minister Singh had asked us to undertake and plan to
further our cooperation in the fields of education, in agriculture, in science
and technology, and in space. We very much would like to welcome an Indian
astronaut to fly on the space shuttle. I think it is clear that our interests
converge on all these issues. With this ambitious agenda, our two countries
are
becoming, in effect, global partners.
Cooperation in several of these areas has already begun and is yielding
results. Just last month, the U.S.-India Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters entered into force, providing for enhanced, streamlined and
more effective law enforcement cooperation between our two countries. On
October 17, Secretary Rice and Indian Science and Technology Minister Sibal
signed an umbrella Science and Technology Agreement that will strengthen U.S.
and Indian capabilities and expand relations between the extensive scientific
and technological communities of both countries This agreement includes a
substantive Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) provision -- another indication
of India's increasing recognition of the need to respect intellectual
property.
The Challenges We Face
We have accomplished much, but we have just scratched the surface of our
partnership with India. Ambassador Mulford and his outstanding team in New
Delhi, aided by frequent high-level visitors to the sub-continent over the
next
several months, will continue to pursue this expanding agenda.
We want the U.S. and India to work together more effectively than we have in
the past to become more effective global partners. Let me provide a few
examples. On the political side of the ledger, we will be seeking early
tangible progress with India towards:
Creating a closer U.S.-India partnership to help build democratic
institutions in the region and worldwide. During the Prime Minister's visit to
Washington, our two leaders agreed for the first time to work together to
promote democracy worldwide. Both countries have contributed to the UN's
Democracy Fund. We will seek ways to work together in strengthening democratic
institutions and practices in specific countries. India's experiment in
democracy has been a success for over half a century, and its 2004 national
polls were the largest exercise in electoral democracy the world has ever
seen.
We share a belief that democracy and development are linked, that effective
democratic governance is a precondition to healthy economic development. In
this regard, we hope India will share its democratic experience with Central
Asian nations, which are having a difficult time making the transition from
authoritarianism to democracy, and assist them in building institutions
necessary to the success of democracy and the advancement of human rights.
Advancing our shared interest in reform at the United Nations. Members of
this Committee know well the President's deep desire to promote reform at the
United Nations. This is a top priority for this Administration, and India as
well. We want a far more vigorous Indian engagement with us in the ongoing
process of reforming the UN into an organization that serves the interests of
its members. I think both our countries would agree that this process should
neither be politicized nor subjected to the sort of country bloc calculations
that prevailed during the Cold War. India has much to offer in moving reform
efforts ahead.
Indian participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative. India boasts
one of the world's largest commercial maritime fleets and a Navy that
demonstrated its rapidly growing expeditionary capacity in responding to the
December tsunami. Indian support for the multi-national Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) would be a boon to the participating nations' goal of
tracking
and interdicting dangerous terrorist and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
cargoes world-wide. We hope India will choose to join PSI.
U.S.-India cooperation for regional peace and stability. India is one of the
largest international donors to Afghanistan's reconstruction and works closely
with us in the areas of road construction, public health, education,
telecommunications, and human resource development. India and the United
States
share the goal of a return to democracy in Nepal and a defeat of the Maoist
insurgency. In Sri Lanka, we both support the government's efforts to recover
from the tsunami and return to the peace process. We should do more to promote
human rights and democracy in autocratic Burma. Our two countries should work
more closely to promote peace and stability in Asia.
Convincing Iran to return to negotiations. India and the U.S. have found an
increasingly positive dialogue on Iran. We are both dedicated to the goal of
an
Iran that lives in harmony in its region, ends support of terrorist groups and
does not seek nuclear weapons. We welcomed India's vote with us at the IAEA in
September to find Iran in noncompliance with its international obligations. We
appreciate India's belief that Iran should not acquire a nuclear weapons
capability, and India's continuing cooperation with the U.S. and Europe is
essential to convince Iran to return to negotiations.
We and India also need to focus on a number of important economic challenges,
both bilateral and global. Since the early 1990s, India has progressed far in
liberalizing its tariff regime and investment environment, and these major
changes have fueled the growth and increased prosperity of recent years. Any
quick survey of India's economic landscape provides thousands of examples of
innovation and excellence. India is increasingly a global competitor in
knowledge-based industries such as information and communications technology
and biotechnology research and development.
Despite its impressive record of economic growth during the last decade, India
still struggles with many of the persistent challenges faced by developing
countries: insufficient and underdeveloped infrastructure, inefficient markets
for goods and services, and minimal access of credit and capital among the
urban and rural poor. In addition, India also suffers from a shortage of
foreign capital and investment, which can bring in key, new technologies,
create jobs, and modernize industries.
In this new partnership, the U.S. and India have a great opportunity to work
together to overcome these challenges, toward the continued prosperity of our
peoples, and to play a positive role in shaping the world's economic future.
The ongoing negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the Doha
Development Round offer the perfect opportunity to work on our shared goals of
trade, development, and prosperity.
Both India and the United States stand to gain from the increasing
liberalization of trade in goods and services, and in convincing our trading
partners to do the same. There is no reason why India and the U.S. should not
be partners in this forum, whose success is so crucial to our common future.
We
plan to work closely with India on proposals that can translate the promise of
the WTO's mission - and the new era of U.S.-India relations - into reality.
This effort will take hard work on both sides, and we look forward to this
opportunity to engage India seriously, to the economic betterment of both our
people.
As we build closer economic relations, we look forward to India's agreement to
purchase American civil and military aircraft and to open its doors further to
trade with our country.
Building People-to-People and Private Sector Cooperation between India and the
U.S.
The new U.S.-India partnership is not and cannot be just between governments.
We have seen an equally powerful expansion of our people-to-people ties and
business growth. The immense power of the India-U.S. people-to-people network
goes deeper than anyone could have ever imagined. We find thousands of
Americans in Delhi, in Mumbai and Bangalore, and even more Indians in New
York,
Washington and Los Angeles. Over 85,000 Americans are living in India, lured
by
its growing economy and the richness of its culture. There are 2 million
persons of Indian origin in the United States, citizens and legal permanent
residents. They are operating businesses in our country, running for political
office and building bridges back to India. There are more Indian students in
the United States today than from any other country in the world -- 80,000.
We have, in essence, the development of a true, comprehensive, across the
board, engagement between India and the United States, our governments, our
societies and our peoples. This engagement by individuals and businesses will
propel and sustain the formal ties between our governments.
Conclusion
I am pleased to have had the opportunity to share with you the many elements
of
this strategic transformation that we are witnessing in the U.S.-India
relationship. Both President Bush and Prime Minister Singh have shown the
confidence and vision to pursue a common vision for the world together. We
hope
the Congress will help us make that vision a reality.
Released on November 2, 2005
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